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STEWART

A.

BAKER*

International Developments
Affecting Digital Signatures
An old encryption technology invented to lock away information may now be
the key to opening the Internet to international commerce on a grand scale.
Digital signature technology provides a simple and secure means of authenticating
electronic documents. This is a critical step toward making the Internet a safe
and reliable environment in which to conduct electronic transactions. Governments and international bodies have been scrambling to establish legal regimes
to govern digital signature transactions in anticipation of the inevitable deluge of
electronic transactions that will arrive as a result of the technology. Unfortunately,
those governments that have examined the question have passed digital signature
legislation with little regard for legislation passed in other countries, thus creating
an international patchwork of regulations that will surely inhibit rather than catalyze cross-border electronic commerce. Moreover, many national and state governments have enacted laws that dangerously over-regulate digital signature transactions, pay insufficient attention to the use of electronic signature technologies
other than digital signature technology, disregard the use of private digital signature commercial networks, and overlook the importance of low-security electronic
transactions. The United States should take a leading role in establishing international standards for digital signature transactions that address these concerns and
rescue digital signature technology from a premature demise.
Over the past three years there has been an explosion of legislative activity
relating to the regulation of electronic signatures, with particular emphasis on
digital signature infrastructures. The State of the Utah has been at the forefront
of the digital signature shock wave. In 1995, Utah enacted one of the earliest,
and most comprehensive, laws authorizing the commercial use of digital signatures.' At least thirty other states have passed some form of legislation regarding
the use of electronic or digital signatures, and in at least eight other states,
*Stewart A. Baker is a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP in Washington, D.C.
1. Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to 46-3-504 (1995).
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proposed electronic and digital signature laws are moving through the legislative
process. 2 In the past few months, bills have also been introduced in Congress
dealing with digital and other forms of electronic signature.3 Recently, a number
of foreign governments have also enacted-or are seriously considering-electronic and digital signature laws. 4
As is evident from the amount of attention being given digital signatures by
legislatures around the world, this technology is popular. Oddly, its popularity
is the biggest obstacle it faces. Digital signature technology may be loved to
death before it ever gets an opportunity to really take off.
I. The Technology
Generally speaking, cryptography entails the enciphering of a message into
a form unreadable to anyone not possessing the key to decipher the message.
Conventional cryptography involves a single mathematical key, known only to
the sender and recipient of an encrypted message, which is used by the sender
of the message to encrypt a message and by the recipient to decrypt it. "Public
Key Cryptography," first described publicly in 1975, is a special method of
encrypting and decrypting messages by means of a pair of mathematically-related
keys. This method involves two keys: a "public key" known to one or more
parties and a "private key" known only to a single party. Either key may be
used to encrypt or decrypt a message.'
In essence, Public Key Cryptography relies on the difficulty of reversing
certain mathematical functions. For example, multiplying to find a product
is easy; factoring to find the numbers that were originally multiplied together
is hard. With big enough numbers, one number may be kept secret and the
other number may be published without any fear that the secret number can
be guessed by an adversary. Thus, everyone in the world can look up the
public number and use it to encrypt a message that only the author can read.
2. States that have passed some form of legislation regarding digital or electronic signatures
include the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Most of the digital or electronic
signature legislation passed by states so far is limited in applicability, though, to transactions with
state agencies; few states have been bold enough to validate the use of digital or electronic signatures
in all commercial transactions. States still considering legislation regarding digital or electronic
signatures include the following: Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
3. Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law of 1998, S. 1594, 105th Cong.; Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of 1997, H.R. 2937, 105th Cong.
4. These countries include Argentina, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore,
and the United Kingdom.
5. Computer hardware and software using two keys for encryption and decryption are referred
to as an "asymmetric cryptosystem."
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That is the part of the public-key revolution that gives the FBI and the National
Security Agency nightmares.
But the flip side of that process is just as intriguing-and may become the
predominant use of public-key technology: If I encrypt a message with my private
key, anyone in the world can decrypt it using my public key. This is no way to
keep secrets, but it is a great way to tell the world that only I could have sent
the message. Since I am the only one in the world who knows what my private
key is, no one else could have written a message that can be decrypted using
my public key. In short, encrypting a message with my private key acts like a
"digital signature," identifying me as the source of the message.
The advantages of this technology for cyberspace are obvious. It allows highly
sensitive material to be put on a network with access restricted by the requirement
that users sign in digitally using their private keys to encrypt messages that can
be checked against their public key. In fact, with only a modest infrastructure,
strangers can do business with other strangers all across the globe by using a
few digital signatures to establish their bona fides.
But how does the recipient of a digitally-signed message know that the identity
he believes to be associated with a certain public-private key pair really is associated with that key pair? What is needed to make this scenario possible is a set
of rules and procedures for certifying the authenticity of digital signatures so
that message senders and recipients can act with confidence. Such a system of
rules and procedures is called a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
In the simplest case, suppose a bank issues digital signatures to each of its
customers who have maintained a $10,000 checking balance over the past year.
If I want to do business on-line with another customer of the bank and he sends
me a copy of his bank-issued digital signature, I can be pretty sure that his $5,000
offer is good. As a practical matter, the bank would probably issue a public-private
key pair to its customers and then tell them to store the private key somewhere
safe (a 31/2-inch floppy would be good; a chip card would be better). The bank
could publish the customer's public key (as well as its own) on the Internet and
elsewhere. However, since the bank will not want to identify its clients as targets
for scams or worse, it is more likely that the bank will privately issue an electronic
certificate that says, "As of October 1, the holder of this private key has maintained a $10,000 checking balance for the past year, signed, His Bank." The
customer can then send that certificate to people who need to know his credit is
good, and they can rely on it as long as they know the bank's public key (needed
to decrypt the bank's certificate) and trust the bank to tell the truth.
How, in practice, do you actually create a digital signature and attach it to
a message? You can acquire commercially-available digital-signature software
capable of generating a public-private key pair, or you can ask a certifying authority to do that for you. Once you have a key pair, the certifying authority must
issue a certificate vouching for your identity and ownership of the public key in
question. The certifying authority then places this certificate in an on-line reposiWINTER 1998
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tory, where it can be viewed by anyone to whom you might send a digitally-signed
message. Now you can begin sending messages. The sender first composes a message. Then, the sender activates the digital-signature software by clicking on an
icon on his computer screen. The sender is prompted to introduce his private key,
which is typically stored on a "cryptographic token," such as a 3'12-inch floppy
disk or "smart card." Ideally, the digital-signature program is executed within
the cryptographic token, so that the private key never migrates into the memory
or processor of the sender's computer where it could be copied or stolen. The
software runs the text of the message through a mathematical algorithm which
generates a short jumble of numbers and letters called a "hash code." Each
message has a unique hash code. The digital-signature software then encrypts
the hash code using the sender's private key. The result is another short jumble
of numbers, letters, and symbols appended to the bottom of the message: a digital
signature unique to the accompanying message.6 The recipient uses the same
software to decrypt the digital signature by reference to the sender's public key.
A successful decryption verifies that the message was in fact sent by the person
whose identity corresponds to the public key. The software then passes the received message through the same algorithm and compares the resulting hash code
to the hash code encrypted into the digital signature. If the two hash codes are
the same, the recipient knows the message was not altered after it was sent; its
integrity has been preserved. The sender will also have a difficult time denying
that the message was sent by him, i.e., repudiating the message. 7
II. Why the Technology Requires New Legal Rules
The efficiency and security that this system allows are tremendously exciting,
but a few problems still exist. First, suppose the customer is sloppy with his private
key. He writes the password to his smart card on the card and then leaves the card
in the washroom. Now anyone who has the card can use his identity-and his credit.
To deal with that problem, the bank needs to maintain an easily accessible list of
stolen or compromised public-private key pairs. This is known as a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). To make the system work, however, anyone who relies on
digital signatures must know about and regularly check the CRL.
But this is the real world. Some people will not check the CRL. They will
get burned. They will blame the bank because it has the most money to pay
damages. They will sue.
Without a law on digital signatures and certificates that apportions liability
among the various parties involved in an electronic transaction (comparable to
6. A digital signature, appearing as an encrypted alphanumeric code, should not be confused
with a digitized signature, which is an electronic representation of the sender's actual written signature.
7. Most laws regulating the use of digital signatures require that a digital signature ensure, at
a minimum, authentication of the identity of the sender of a message, message integrity, and message
nonrepudiation.
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the banking and checking provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code), no one
knows how such a suit will come out. The bank can write a contract with the
customer that demands he be careful with his private key and perhaps even makes
him liable for his negligence. But consumer groups would oppose enforcement
of such contracts (digital signature buffs call this the "Grandma picks a bad
password and loses her house" problem). Even worse from the bank's point of
view, it does not have a contract with the person who got burned by the compromised signature. He is just an innocent third party who lost money-by relying
on the word of the bank, his lawyer will argue.
Without more legal certainty about how to protect themselves (or how much
insurance to buy), companies with deep pockets will not want to take that risk.
They will stay out of the business of issuing digital signatures and digital certificates for such transactions. In fact, for a decade or more, that has mostly been
the story: Cool math confronts corporate legal department; cool math loses.
III. How Digital Signatures Are Actually Being Implemented Today
The technology is too good to be locked up by lawyers forever. Companies
that wanted to use digital-signature technologies began looking for places where
this open-ended liability was not a big problem. They found at least two.
A.

CHEAP CERTIFICATES

First, companies offered certificates paired with a sweeping disclaimer of any
liability. These certificates are not suited for high-value transactions, but they
can be used in a lot of circumstances where even a no-liability signature is better
than no signature at all.
Millions of cheap, liability-free certificates are already in circulation. Some
certificates, for example, do little more than confirm that a given user's name
corresponds to a particular e-mail address, as determined by examination of the
register maintained by the certifying authority; such certificates do not authenticate the identity associated with a digital signature. Though helpful, such certificates would not afford the level of security desired by the parties to a high-value
electronic transaction. The secure socket layer (SSL) encryption that everyone
uses for secure web connections also relies in part on digital signatures to identify
the server and the browser to each other. No one really guarantees the server's
public key, but if it is the same one every time I log on, I can be fairly sure that
I am dealing with the same server, belonging to the same store, rather than to
an on-line con-artist. Other Internet-based cheap certificates include the "authenticode" certificates used to identify the authors of Java-like ActiveX programs.
The "authenticode" certificates offer a modest, but better-than-nothing, security
precaution for Internet users who are understandably reluctant to let codes written
by strangers gain access to their computer's operating system.
WINTER 1998
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CLOSED SYSTEM CERTIFICATES

Second, some digital-signature proponents have begun creating what amounts
to their own law, by contract. Any group of companies or individuals may, of
course, do business in accordance with one or more agreements setting forth the
liability and other rules that govern their relationships; such closed communities
can create a self-contained set of rules to cover digital signatures. IBM, for
example, can issue digital-identity certificates to all of its employees; it can say
that they are good for e-mail attribution and for petty cash requests but not for
private transactions unrelated to work-or whatever rules that IBM is comfortable
with. Or, in a more exciting use, Visa can issue certificates to all of its member
banks, and they can issue certificates to all of their cardholders and merchants.
Suddenly, shoppers don't have to type their credit card numbers on the screen
at Amazon.com, and they do not have to worry about Internet card number theft.
Within the preexisting Visa relationships, all those tough liability problems
become easy. Visa simply says that using a digital signature will not substantially
change the existing liability rules for any of the system participants. Liability is
already covered by an elaborate set of agreements and rules, some driven by
long-standing government regulations. (Remember Grandma and her house? For
credit cards, the rule is clear inside the United States: if she picks a bad password,
she may lose fifty bucks but she will not lose her house.) In fact, Visa and
Mastercard have built digital signatures into a Secure Electronic Transaction
protocol (SET) that is already being implemented in several countries. 8
IV. Lawyers to the Rescue?
While all of this was going on, the lawyers themselves began to look for
legislative solutions. In 1995, a committee of the American Bar Association led
by Michael Baum (now the top lawyer at VeriSign) designed a comprehensive
model law to deal with all the new legal issues arising from digital signatures.
While that work was underway, the state of Utah took the plunge, enacting a
variant of the ABA draft. Within three years, more than forty state legislatures
were contemplating digital signature laws. So were numerous countries; indeed,
by the fall of 1997, Germany, Malaysia, and Italy already had their own laws,
and many more bills were in legislative hoppers around the world.

8. On October 14, 1997, VeriSign, a company specializing in software for use in secure electronic transactions, announced that it would issue a new type of digital identifier for banks and
financial institutions interested in doing business over the Internet. The new digital certificate, called
Financial Service ID, vouches for the identities of banks, brokerages, and pension funds that support
the Open Financial Exchange specification created by Microsoft, Intuit, and CheckFree for home
banking services. The special digital certificates will be restricted, however, to large financial institutions. VeriSign already issues several personal digital IDs to Internet users and offers digital certificates
for banks, merchants, and individuals under the SET protocol. See Tim Clark, Locking Up Home
Banking (visited Oct. 14, 1997) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/O,4,15222,00.html>.
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This should be good news-lawyers and lawmakers working together to solve
a legal problem and enable the birth of a new technology. But it is not. As we will
see, it is posing a growing threat to the burgeoning use of low-value certificates and
closed certificate systems.
Digital signature laws are often sold to legislators as a way to bring written
signature requirements into the computer age. An image is conjured up of digital
signatures being rejected by courts insisting on something executed with a quill
pen. This is an overstated problem, at least in the United States and for most
commercial transactions. Courts have, after all, been treating printed telegrams
as signed documents for a century. There is nothing about a digital signature
that makes it a harder legal problem than telegrams-or telexes, or typed letters,
or faxed signatures, or a dozen other ways in which real-world commercial actors
have lawfully signed contracts over the last century.
What digital signatures need-uniquely-from the law is certainty about the
obligations and rights of three parties:
(1) the keyholder who is identified by the public key and who controls the
private key,
(2) the certifying authority (CA) who vouches for the public key and ties it
to the identity (or creditworthiness, or chess club membership, or whatever) of the keyholder, and
(3) the relying party who gets the public key and the certificate and decides
to trust the certificate.
The Utah law, and the ABA guidelines, decided to spell out all of these duties
in great detail. In particular, to make sure that relying parties could trust CAs,
the Utah law and the ABA called for government licensing. The government
would make sure that prospective CAs are trustworthy and that they remain so.
It would check the technical and other security measures that CAs use to protect
keys and would enforce rules about documents CAs should demand before certifying someone's signature. (Can the CA issue an identity certificate based on one
piece of identification or must it see three? Does it have to check the keyholder's
address? And so on.)
For the most part, the Utah bill is also pretty tough on keyholders. If they are
not careful with their private keys, they will lose their houses. Early boosters
of the technology, however, thought the alternative was worse: Relying parties
and certifying authorities might refuse to participate in digital signature transactions if keyholders could invalidate transactions after the fact by making up a
story about having been negligent with their keys.
V. How Many Lawmakers Does It Take to
Screw Up an Infrastructure?
Two problems with the Utah approach only became apparent as digital signature
laws began to sweep through legislature after legislature.
WINTER 1998
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CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

First, not every lawmaker saw the policy issues in the same way as Utah
lawmakers. And the more detailed the legislation, the more room there was for
fatal conflicts between state laws, sometimes on the most inconsequential points.
For example, both Utah and Washington require a CA to suspend a certificate
if the CA gets a call from the keyholder saying the private key has been compromised. (In Utah, the keyholder has a big incentive to act fast; he wants the
compromised key suspended before somebody sells his house.)
But to guard against fraud or pranks ("Hey, guys, let's call up the bank and
suspend our gym teacher's public key."), the CA cannot suspend the key for
long without checking to make sure that the suspension request really came from
the keyholder. Under Utah law, the check has to be done within two days, but
the certificate is automatically suspended whenever the CA gets a request from
someone claiming to be the keyholder. Under Washington law, the caller can
ask for a four-day suspension, but the CA can only suspend the certificate if the
CA is pretty sure that the caller really is the keyholder.
Same basic idea in both states. But what if you are a CA doing business in
both states and you get a suspension request from someone who does not sound
very much like the keyholder? In Utah, you must suspend; in Washington, you
cannot. Or suppose the caller asks for three days to come in and verify his identity?
In Utah, you cannot wait that long; in Washington, you must. CAs simply cannot
obey the laws of both states.
Other states have tried to avoid such problems by writing less detailed laws,
leaving a lot to regulatory authorities. But that just postpones the conflicts, and
perhaps makes them harder to find. It does not eliminate the likelihood of conflicting regulations. After all, many of the questions addressed by the Utah law have
no easy answer. How much risk should the keyholder bear and how much should
fall on the CA? Different states, and certainly different countries, will arrive at
different answers to such questions. But if CAs must change their practice in
each country or each state, there will be very few CAs in ten years, and digital
signatures will not live up to their promise.
B.

STATE LICENSING

An even bigger potential problem is the solution Utah used to ensure the quality
ofCAs. Having CAs obtain licenses from the state in exchange for accepting regulation by the state is very appealing in many ways. Licensing is flexible, allows the
state to "back up" the digital signature of a licensed CA with a state-issued certificate, and gives unhappy parties somewhere to go with complaints.
But what if licensing is mandatory? Suddenly, many cheap but useful certificates could become too much trouble to bother with. Take the example of a
merchant who wants to improve on-line shopping security by issuing customer
certificates: "This certifies that the holder has purchased more than five books
VOL. 32, NO. 4
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at Amazon.com using the name 'Stewart Baker'." If Amazon.com cannot issue
a simple customer certificate without registering in fifty states and complying
with all of the security rules that apply to the high-trust certificates, it will just
stop using certificates like this. And we will all have a little less security when
we shop on-line.
So far, in the United States, licensing has remained voluntary. If a CA wants
the imprimatur of the state of Utah, it must register there. If not, not. Either
way, the CA can lawfully issue certificates to Utah residents. Actually, there
are still some disadvantages that will push many firms into registering in most
states, but I am ignoring them for simplicity.
This is not so abroad. Germany's law contains no savings clause for cheap
certificates. It implies that no one may issue certificates without meeting strict
standards for security; these standards include a requirement that private keys
be stored only on a smart card-they cannot be sent over the Internet, and they
cannot be stored on a magnetic stripe card or 31/2-inch floppy.
If pressed, German authorities sometimes say that they will not punish those
who issue unauthorized certificates. That seems to be what they are telling the
European Commission, which is worried about the trade-restricting impact of
the German law. But privately, some officials say that within three years the
licensing regime will be mature and unauthorized CAs will be stamped out.9
In Malaysia, that future is now. Malaysia's recently enacted digital signature
bill makes it clear that anyone who issues certificates must register in Malaysia.
And it is not just cheap but useful certificates that will be affected. SET,
arguably the most sweeping and important use of digital signature technology
to actually see the light of day, is also harmed by the proliferation of registration
requirements. Neither Malaysia nor Germany was willing to make a clear exception in its law even for entirely private and consensual uses of digital signatures.
VI. Why Conflicting Rules Will Not Go Away by Themselves
What is going on here? Partly, of course, it is just that some governments
choose regulatory solutions for everything. In Europe, the idea of letting market
forces act is viewed with suspicion in the best of times. It sounds even less
plausible coming from the same Internet advocates who cheerfully proclaim that
national borders are just speed bumps on the information highway and that important national policies-on distribution of pornography, on wiretapping, and
a host of other issues-will soon be rendered unenforceable by a global market.

9. On December 19, 1997, Germany's Office for Information Security announced it would
review and possibly revise its proposed technical specifications for digital signatures and CAs. Germany's Proposed Technical Specificationsfor Digital Signatures, CAs to be Revised, ELECTRONIC INFO.
PoL'Y & L. REP. (BNA) 8 (Jan. 7, 1998). The German technical specifications, published in a book
over 300 pages long, were widely criticized for requiring a very high level of security and for being
over-regulatory, much too complicated, and inflexible. Id.
WINTER 1998

972

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Worse, many other nations fear that such statements are just a disguised bid
for American domination: "Leave it to the market, where our companies have
an enormous lead." So government regulation looks to these nations as a cheap
way to even the odds; whatever competitive problems local technology companies
may have in other arenas, they surely know more than Americans about working
successfully with local authorities.
The case for regulation gets stronger as the stakes get higher as well. If the
main use for digital signatures will be for a national identity card that includes
bank account access, the companies issuing those certificates should be watched
closely. If legislators do not know much about other uses of digital-signature
technology, or if a digital-signature law is being jammed through the legislature
by a few interested parties under the guise of modernizing signature requirements,
it is not likely that closed systems or low-value certificates will get much attention
from the legislative drafters.
Whatever the motivation for this outburst of regulatory zeal, the results will
likely be a disaster for implementation of a public key infrastructure. Even if they
might be able to get an exemption from most laws, users and issuers of cheap certificates cannot bear even a remote prospect of liability in a handful of countries. Rather
than register, they will find weaker, less-regulated alternatives to digital signatures-or they will do without entirely. The same goes for "closed system" users
of digital signatures. Burgeoning regulations that are not tailored to their private
certificate system will create disincentives for credit card companies to use digital
signatures. In short, this outbreak of regulatory enthusiasm is likely to make digital
signatures much rarer and much riskier for prospective certificate authorities.
The next question is what U.S. policymakers should do to avoid this train
wreck. Inside the United States, efforts to write a uniform state law that would
resolve some of these issues are moving forward, but slowly. There are honest
disagreements about how much liability to assign to the parties to a transaction
and how much freedom of contract should be recognized in a complex field with
major implications for consumers. So even if a uniform law is agreed upon, it
may not exactly sweep the nation.
That is why there is support for at least a limited form of preemption by the
federal government, perhaps just a list of things that states will not be allowed to
do such as imposing their rules on otherwise valid "closed" systems or requiring
issuers of even low-value certificates to register as CAs. These restrictions might
be enough, for example, to reassure financial institutions and others that they can
use digital signatures to secure payment systems without fear of being surprised by
newly imposed state liabilities.
At the international level, the U.S. government has stated its support for the
establishment of a Global Information Infrastructure (GII)'0 as a means of promot10. See The White House, Frameworkfor Global Electronic Commerce (visited Sept. 21, 1998)
<http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm > (Administration's recent White Paper on the GII).
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ing trade and commerce, especially electronic commerce. Such an ambitious
objective, however, would necessarily require the harmonization of world legal
norms governing the use of digital signatures, as the number of transactions
involving digital signatures can only be expected to grow. Persuading other countries to adopt the same rules usually requires lengthy bilateral or multilateral
negotiations resulting in a treaty or other agreement. But there are at least two
other models as well.
A. OECD
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) specializes in nonbinding, consensual codes of conduct and guidelines. These codes
and guidelines are developed by the world's richest nations to coordinate policies
on a variety of topics from privacy to cryptography.
The OECD has recently released a paper on issues raised by international
certification of digital signatures, and it shows some of the OECD's strengths
and weaknesses as a forum. To bolster its claim that it should address the
digital signature issue, the OECD notes that it has already done extensive
work on privacy and on cryptography guidelines. The report suggests that
both are related to digital signatures because digital signatures allow extensive
tracking of individuals and because the technology is closely tied to encryption
and the law-enforcement-access debate that dominated the OECD's deliberations on cryptography.
This observation is a.distinctly two-edged sword for OECD. Both the privacy
and the cryptography guidelines were a source of continued and bitter controversy.
Digital signatures do not have to be dragged into either debate, but handing the
problem to the OECD more or less guarantees a replay of past three-way battles
between government, industry, and privacy advocates.
B. UNCITRAL
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
plays a consensus-building role for a larger audience-UN members. In addition,
its products tend to be more specific and less controversial, focusing on achieving
technical consensus on the language of model laws or conventions to regulate
aspects of international trade including international arbitration, international sale
of goods, and the like.
UNCITRAL already has a concrete record of achievement on technical legal
issues affecting digital signatures. It has released a model law on electronic
commerce, the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (Model
Law), which reflects the contributions of more than fifty countries over a
three-year period. The Model Law, which has also been endorsed by the UN's
General Assembly, treats digital (and other electronic) signatures attached to
a message as valid and binding, so long as the method of signing was "as
WINTER 1998
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reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated.""'
Although the Model Law itself lays to rest any questions about the validity
of digital signatures for purposes of commercial transactions, UNCITRAL recognized that digital signatures and PKI raise legal issues going well beyond this
point. For that reason, UNCITRAL's Working Group on Electronic Commerce
(Working Group) has already begun work on a set of Uniform Rules to deal with
certification authorities and the problems relating to the recognition of foreign
electronic signatures. Unfortunately, the work done so far suggests that UNCITRAL's efforts could easily fail to produce a consensus. Thus, it is not clear that
the UNCITRAL efforts will in fact provide the kind of relief and assurance of
legality needed by producers of low-value certificates and closed systems that
use digital signatures.
The draft produced early in 1997 by an UNCITRAL Working Group on certification authorities was clearly cast in the "high-value, government-regulated"
mold. It envisioned "authorized" certification authorities meeting detailed state
standards, and it was fairly prescriptive with respect to the nature of the certificates
issued. For example, the draft would have required that any certificate issued
by a CA state the identity of the party receiving it. This is difficult if the certificate
is to be used to identify software or servers, and it is even imprudent in the
context of credit cards. Credit card companies generally resist allowing the use
of their cards for general identification purposes; the credit card companies are
more interested in verifying creditworthiness than identity.
More recent meetings have resulted in new drafts that limit the most heavily
regulatory language. But at least Germany-and perhaps other European nations-remain wedded in varying degrees to the notion that certification services
are too important to be left to the private market. What is more, the Europeans
have shown only modest sympathy for private, closed systems using digital signatures and virtually none for issuers of cheap certificates.
UNCITRAL is, in the end, a consensus-driven body, and it is clear that no
consensus will be reached if low-value and closed-system certificates are not
recognized in some fashion. But consensus runs two ways. Supporters of regulation may well insist that the final draft also endorse a highly regulatory scheme.
Perhaps some method of accommodating both systems can be found. If not, the
consensus process will fail. The UNCITRAL process may not be able to broker
serious differences among nations. "

11.United Nations: UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, Dec. 16, 1996, art. 7,
36 I.L.M. 197, 204 (1997).
12. The UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce was to meet in session again in
November 1998.
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VII. Which is the Right Forum?
Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly likely that serious differences will
arise internationally between countries enamored of the high-regulation, hightrust model and those more open to market developments in digital signature
use. This opens the door to protectionism and discrimination. Germany has already enacted a law that automatically recognizes equivalent signatures from
other EU countries, but says that recognition of U.S. signatures will have to wait
for the negotiation of a bilateral or multilateral agreement. France has announced
that for national security reasons only French-owned companies may serve as
the trusted third parties who will be CAs in France. Italy reserves a special place
among CAs for Italian notaries.
UNCITRAL is an unlikely place to combat such tendencies. It does not have
a tradition of brokering trade disputes. The OECD is a more plausible forum
for addressing such differences, but its process yields only guidelines, not binding
agreements.
Are there other fora? Perhaps. The WTO does have some claim to jurisdiction
over trade in services but it lacks a clear framework for resolving this matter.
More interestingly, the U.S. Government and the European Commission-usually
antagonists on trade-may have some common interests here. Both are concerned
that excessive regulation of digital signatures will lead to inconsistent standards
and discrimination within their boundaries. And both have been a bit left out as
their constituent parts raced to define new regulatory schemes. While there are
pitfalls, the United States and the European Union might be able to reach a quick
understanding on at least some basic rules to discipline the digital signature laws
of their constituent states.
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